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JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court is based on Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(3)0)(2001).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Stewart's disagrees with the statement of issues set forth in Schaerrer's
Brief, and also disagrees with the standard of review asserted by Schaerrer as being
applicable to Schaerrer's issue no. 1. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 24(b)(1), Utah R. App.
P., Stewart's submits a separate statement of issues.
ISSUE PRESENTED BY SCHAERRER'S APPEAL
1.

Did the trial court correctly determine that if a defendant is subject

to strict product liability only as a result of being in the chain of distribution of a product,
then that defendant is entitled to indemnification from upstream suppliers of the defective
product?
Standard of Review: "A grant of summary judgment is reviewed for
correctness." Gerbich v. Newmed, Inc., 977 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 1999).
ISSUE PRESENTED BY STEWART'S CROSS-APPEAL
1.

Did the trial court correctly determine that Stewart's was not entitled

to immunity from claims of strict product liability?
Standard of Review: The trial court's legal conclusions are afforded no
deference, and are reviewed for correctness. Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Irrigation Co., 813
P.2dll69, 1171 (Utah 1991).
-2-

Issue Preserved: Stewart's Cross-Appeal was preserved in its Notice of
Cross-Appeal which identified the ruling of the trial court dated September 1, 2000,
denying summary judgment. (Notice of Cross Appeal, Record at 1170; Trial Court's
Ruling Denying Summary Judgment, Record at 1008, Addendum ("Add.") tab 1.)
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUES, ETC., DETERMINATIVE OF APPEAL
None.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I

NATURE OF THE CASE.
Plaintiff Jeannie Schaerrer asserted that she was entitled to recover damages

for injuries resulting from an allegedly defective drag - fenfluramine. While Schaerrer's
Complaint alleges many causes of action against defendant Stewart's, following
discovery it was clear that the only claim supported by evidence was a strict product
liability claim based upon Stewart's sale (pursuant to a valid prescription) of the drug
fenfluramine to Schaerrer. (See Memorandum Decision of Judge James Taylor dated
October 18, 2000, at Record 1058 and attached at Add. tab 2; and Add. tab 3, Findings of
Fact No. 2.)
H.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Schaerrer's appeal and Stewart's cross-appeal relate to three motions and

three rulings of the trial court. First, Stewart's moved for summary judgment on or about
May 12, 2000. (Record at 594.) The court denied Stewart's motion for summary
judgment and it is that denial that forms the basis of Stewart's Cross-Appeal. (Record at
-3-

1008, Add. tab 1.) Second, following the denial of Stewart's motion for summary
judgment, the court reconsidered its ruling and granted Stewart's partial summary
judgment. (Add. tab 2.) That ruling is not the subject of an appeal, but it unequivocally
establishes certain facts hereinafter identified as important to an understanding of this
case.
Third, on November 29, 2000, Stewart's filed another Motion for Summary
Judgment, based in part on the findings of the court with respect to Stewart's first motion
for summary judgment. This time, the motion was granted. The court issued findings of
fact, conclusions of law and entered final judgment in Stewart's favor. (Record at 11531161, Add. tab 3.) This appeal followed.
III.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the summer of 1995, Jeanne Schaerrer began taking the drugs

phentermine and fenfluramine to lose weight. The drugs were prescribed by her
physician, Dr. Jeffrey Johnson (a defendant) and purchased from Woolsey Pharmacy (not
a defendant). (Record at 644-660, Dr. Johnson's records; Record at 619, 642, Woosley
Pharmacy records.) On November 2, 1996, Schaerrer, for the first time, presented to
Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy a prescription written by Dr. Johnson. The prescription called
for 15 capsules, with each capsule to contain 20 milligrams of the drug phentermine and
60 milligrams of the drug fenfluramine, to be taken once daily. (Record at 617, Dr.
Johnson's actual prescription; Record at 703, Deposition testimony of Schaerrer.) The
prescription written by Dr. Johnson was filled by Stewart Koeven, a pharmacist and
-4-

proprietor of Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy (hereinafter collectively "Stewart's") by
combining the drug fenfluramine, purchased by Stewart's from defendant PCCA, and the
drug phentermine, purchased by Stewart's from several sources, in a single capsule.
{Record at 693, Deposition testimony of Stewart Koeven.)
Over the next six months, concluding on June 16, 1997, Dr. Johnson wrote
four additional prescriptions for Jeanne Schaerrer to receive additional amounts of
phentermine and fenfluramine combined into a single capsule. {Record at 616-613,
Dr. Johnson prescriptions.) Each prescriptions was filled by Stewart Koeven by
combining fenfluramine purchased from PCCA, with phentermine purchased from a
variety of sources. {Record at 693, Deposition testimony of Stewart Koeven.) Sometime
before mid-July of 1997, Mrs. Schaerrer ceased taking fenfluramine. {Record at 699,
Deposition of Jeanne Schaerrer.)
Stewart's did not make or create either drug. Rather, Stewart's merely
combined the already manufactured drugs in a single capsule. (Id). The unchallenged
ruling of the trial court establishes that combining the drugs did not render either drug
more dangerous than if taken separately. In fact, Schaerrer conceded this point. (Add.
tab 2; Add. tab 3, finding of fact no. 2.) The injuries of the plaintiff cannot be attributed
to combining the drugs. (Id)
On or about February 8, 1999, Stewart's filed a Cross-Claim against codefendant PCCA, from whom Stewart's acquired all of the fenfluramine that was
purchased from Stewart's by Schaerrer. The Cross-Claim asserted a right of common-5-

law indemnification against PCCA based upon the well-established traditional concept
that all entities in the chain of distribution of an allegedly defective product may obtain
indemnification from those up the chain of distribution, ending ultimately with the
product manufacturer.1 In its Finding of Fact dated April 30, 2001, the court found that
Stewart's Cross-Claim against defendant PCCA sought common-law indemnification: "in
the event that the fenfluramine supplied by PCCA to Stewart's was determined to be
defective." (Add. tab 3, ^f 7 of the court's Findings of Fact.) This fact does not appear to
be disputed by Schaerrer.
On or about January 19, 2000, Schaerrer entered a Release and Settlement
Agreement with defendant PCCA. In pertinent part, the Release provided that not only
was PCCA released from all claims, but that Schaerrer also waived her right to recover
from any party that could obtain indemnification from PCCA for liability arising from
her claims. (Add. tab 3, Findings of Fact, 6, 7, and 8.)
On April 30, 2001, the court granted Stewart's second Motion for Summary
Judgment. The court found that as a matter of law: if Schaerrer recovered on her only
remaining claim - that of strict product liability - against Stewart's, then Stewart's would
be able to obtain indemnity from PCCA for all such liability. Rather than requiring all of
the parties to go to the time and expense of a trial and subsequent action between

1

For reasons unknown to Stewart's, Stewart's Answer and Cross-Claim, which
should appear in the record at p. 71, is gone. In its place there is a handwritten note
created by Carma B. Smith, clerk deputy of the Fourth Judicial District Court, stating that
the Answer and Cross-Claim are gone, but offering no explanation. {Record at p. 71.)
-6-

Stewart's and PCCA regarding the right of indemnity, the court concluded that even if
Schaerrer prevailed, she would have to waive her right to recovery based upon the
unambiguous language of the Release she executed with PCCA. If Schaerrer prevailed
against Stewart's, PCCA's obligation to indemnify Stewart's would be triggered, and
once triggered, Schaerrer was required by the Release to waive her right to recover from
Stewart's. (Add. tab 3, pp. 5-7 of the court's Conclusions of Law.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Summary of Argument Applicable to Schaerrer's Appeal.
The findings of fact made by the trial court on April 30, 2001 should be
entirely accepted by this Court because there has been no appropriate challenge to such
findings. Schaerrer has not identified a challenge to such findings in her brief, and in any
event, has failed to meet the marshaling of evidence requirement to make such a
challenge.
These findings of fact, along with the trial court's unchallenged earlier
findings when granting partial summary judgment to Stewart's, establish the correctness
of the court's eventual ruling granting complete summary judgment to Stewart's. Where
plaintiff concedes that a defendant's conduct did not materially alter a product claimed to
be effective, then that defendant is entitled to indemnification from those who supplied
the product to the defendant. This well established principle was not altered by the Utah
Liability Reform Act.

-7-

Summary of Argument Regarding Stewart's Cross-Appeal
Traditionally, pharmacists have been considered immune from claims of
strict product liability when they fill a valid prescription for a drug, and the pharmacist
does not alter the drug in any material way. Stewart's raised this immunity to Schaerrer's
claims. The trial court rejected this argument based upon the chance that a jury could
conclude that Stewart's was a "manufacturer" and not a "pharmacist" because Stewart's
combined phentermine with fenfluramine in a single capsule. Stewart's contends that the
trial court exalted form over substance. While Stewart's activities combining
fenfluramine and phentermine in a capsule might be considered by a jury to be consistent
with the activities of a manufacturer, those activities have nothing to do with this case.
There is no evidence that the combining of phentermine and fenfluramine altered the
fenfluramine consumed by Jeanne Schaerrer in any way. There is no evidence that
Stewart's "manufacturing" activities caused injury. It was Stewart's role as pharmacist (a
seller of drugs prescribed by physicians) that formed the basis of Schaerrer's claims and
as a pharmacist, Stewart's is immune from Schaerrer's claims.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE UNCHALLENGED.
The trial court'sfindingsof fact (Add. tab 3) should be accepted by this
Court as controlling for this appeal. Schaerrer has not identified a challenge to such
findings of fact in her brief, and has made no effort to marshal the evidence that would
-8-

support the findings of fact. In the absence of appropriate marshaling of the evidence, the
trial court's findings of fact should be accepted as controlling by this Court. Hales Sand
& Gravel v. Audit Div., 842 P.2d 887, 893 (Utah 1992); Christensen v. Monns, 812 P.2d
69, 72 (Utah 1991); Rule 24(a)(9), Utah RApp.P. The trial court's findings in its
memorandum decision of October 18, 2000 should also be accepted as controlling
because those findings are not the subject of Schaerrer's appeal. (Record at 1163, 1164,
Schaerrer's Notice of Appeal.)
Each of the trial court's findings of fact are significant. For example, the
trial court found that Stewart's had asserted an effective claim against PCCA for strict
product liability common-law indemnification, and that the validity of the Release
executed by plaintiff, including the provision relied upon by the court to grant summary
judgment to Stewart's, was unchallenged. The trial court found that: "No evidence was
submitted to the court to suggest that the terms of the PCCA Release should not be
enforced according to the ordinary meaning of its plain and unambiguous terms." (Add.
tab 3, Tj 8, Findings of Fact.) According to those plain terms, if Stewart's is entitled to
indemnification from PCCA, Schaerrer waived her right to recover from Stewart's. This
point is established and uncontested. Further, the court found that Stewart's so-called
"manufacturing" activities did not cause Schaerrer's injuries and Schaerrer conceded this
point. (Add. tab 2; tab 3, Finding of Fact no. 2.)

-9-

POINT n
STEWART'S IS ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION FROM PCCA.
A.

The Limited Nature of Stewart's Liability.
In this case, the trial court's unchallenged finding is that Stewart's did

nothing that caused plaintiff injury except sell her fenfluramine. There is no evidence in
this case that a breach of the standard of care by Stewart's caused injury. There is no
evidence in this case that the combining of fenfluramine with phentermine caused injury.
There is no evidence that Stewart's so-called marketing efforts caused Schaerrer's
injuries. There is no evidence that Stewart's lack of warnings regarding the one-a-day
capsule caused injury. There is no evidence that Stewart's altered in any material way
the fenfluramine that it purchased from PCCA. The fenfluramine supplied by Stewart's
was in no way more dangerous or more likely to cause injury than was the fenfluramine
supplied to plaintiff by anyone else. (Add. tab 3, trial court's Findings of Fact.) The only
claim that plaintiff had against Stewart's which was supported by evidence was the claim
that Stewart's should be strictly liable purely because of Stewart's presence in the chain
of distribution of fenfluramine. It is only because the doctrine of strict product liability
allows plaintiff to recover from every entity within the chain of distribution that plaintiff
has a claim against Stewart's. No other claims were supported by evidence of causation.
(Add. tab 3, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment; and Memorandum
Decision Add. tab 2.)

-10-

B.

Stewart's is Liable, if at all, Only Because Everyone in the Chain of
Distribution Is Jointly Strictly Liable.
Even though joint and several liability was generally eliminated by the Utah

Tort Reform Act in 1986,2 when a plaintiff asserts a claim of strict product liability,
everyone in the chain of distribution of the allegedly defective product is jointly liable
with everyone else in the chain of distribution for injuries caused by the product. See
Restatement (Third) Torts, § 1, and comments b through e; Restatement (Second) Torts, §
402A(1) and comment f.
Historically, the reason that everyone, from the manufacturer who created
the defective product, to the retail seller entirely ignorant of the product's defect, was
liable for 100 percent of plaintiffs injuries is that the injured party may have no
connection or contact with anyone other than the entity from whom the product was
purchased and the injured party must rely upon the retail seller for an assurance of safety.
Id Sellers are liable for defective products sold "even though [the seller] has exercised
all possible care in the preparation and sale of the product." Restatement (Second) Torts,
§ 402A, comment a. Without this traditional doctrine of joint liability, Jeanne Schaerrer
would have no claim against Stewart's in this case. She has no evidence to support any
other claim. All of her other claims based upon Stewart's alleged manufacturing activity,

2

Joint and several liability was eliminated in Utah with the adoption of the Utah
Liability Reform Act, U.C.A. § 78-27-38 (1986); most other states have likewise
eliminated joint and several liability and have adopted a comparative responsibility
approach of one form or another. See Restatement (Third) Torts, § 23 Contribution,
Reporter's Note comment e, and the cases collected.
-11-

fail because of a lack of causation evidence. No evidence was submitted to the trial
court, and none exists, that anything that Stewart's did or didn't do, however that conduct
might be characterized, caused Jeanne Schaerrer's injures except that Stewart's sold
fenfluramine to Jeanne Schaerrer.3
C.

Upstream Indemnification Is a Necessary Element of Strict Products Liability
Historically, everyone downstream (assemblers, wholesalers, retailers) from

the original producer of a defective product has been entitled to obtain indemnification
from everyone upstream. This principle strikes an appropriate balance between providing
the injured party with the opportunity for recovery from anyone in the chain of
distribution, and still allowing those in the chain of distribution to pass liability up the
chain towards entities best able to eliminate defects.4 The Supreme Court of New Jersey
concisely explained this principle in Promaulayko v. Johns Manville Sales Corp., 562
A.2d 202 (N.J. 1989). The court stated:
This approach is consistent also with the principle of focusing
on the defective product as it proceeds down the chain of
distribution. In general, the effect of requiring the party
closest to the original producer to indemnify parties farther
down the chain is to shift the risk of loss to the most efficient
accident avoider. (citations omitted.) Passing the cost of risk
up the distributive chain also fulfills, as a general rule, the
goal of distributing the risk to the party best able to bear it.
3

Of course, there are exceptions to the principle that liability extends to everyone in the
chain of distribution. One of those exceptions would apply if the fact-finder in this case
determined that Stewart's is a pharmacist, and not a manufacturer. Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 584 A.2d 1383, 1387-1388 (Pa. 1991) (and the many cases cited therein).
4

Though Schaerrer voluntarily waived that right in this case.
-12-

Id. at 206. It is "well settled" that this same principle allows a downstream manufacturer
who incorporates, by assembly or otherwise, a defective component part into a finished
product to obtain indemnification from the suppliers of the defective component. See
Rowland Truck Equip. Inc. v. Everwear Prod, Inc., 468 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1985) wherein
the court stated:
The law is well settled that when a manufacturer of a finished
product is held strictly liable for damages caused to a third
person by a defective component part that was purchased
from a supplier and integrated into the finished product, the
said manufacturer is entitled to recover indemnity from the
party supplying the defective component part, provided the
manufacturer was not himself negligent in either creating or
failing to discover the defect.
Id. at 394; Jones v. Arrow Chem., 680 F.Supp. 338, 340 (D. Mont. 1987); Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Reeves, 486 So.2d 374, 379 n. 4 (Miss. 1986); Kicklighter v. Nails By
Janai, Inc., 616 F.2d 734, 739 (5th Cir. 1980); American Jurisprudence 2d at Vol. 63B,
Products Liability, § 1748 (1997).
Therefore, if Schaerrer proved that fenfluramine is defective, then Stewart's
would be entitled to indemnification from PCCA because PCCA supplied to Stewart's a
defective component part; i.e., fenfluramine.
In response to these well established principles, plaintiff raises two
arguments.
First, plaintiff argues that upstream indemnification is not available in Utah
because the Liability Reform Act "eliminated the need for . . . indemnity." (Schaerrer's
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Brief beginning at p. 15.) Plaintiff's argument proves too much. Indemnification in the
context of a strict product liability claim arose because those farther down the chain of
distribution are considered just as liable to the injured party as those up the chain of
distribution. Without that concept, plaintiff has no claim against Stewart's. If the Utah
Liability Reform Act eliminated this joint chain of distribution liability, there would be
no need for indemnification, but there would also be no legal basis for Schaerrer's claim
against Stewart's. If, however, joint chain of distribution liability survived the enactment
of the Utah Liability Reform Act, then chain of distribution indemnification must also
survive the Liability Reform Act. The exact same reasons which led courts to
acknowledge chain of distribution indemnification before the elimination of joint and
several liability generally, are still just as applicable because the elimination of joint and
several liability did not eliminate joint chain of distribution liability. This simple
proposition has led courts to uniformly reject the argument Schaerrer is asserting before
this Court. Degener v. Hall Contracting Corp., 27 S.W.3d 775, 780 (Kent. 2000);
Rotono v. Access Indus. Inc., 26 Conn.L.Rptr., 274, 2000 WestLaw 151231 (Conn.
2000); Horowitz v. Schneider Nat % Inc., 992 F.2d 279, 280-81 (10th Cir. 1993). This
Court should likewise reject Schaerrer's argument.
Furthermore, Schaerrer's suggestion that the jury's ability to apportion fault
between Stewart's and PCCA is a substitute for indemnification simply doesn't make
sense in light of the underlying principles of strict product liability. Assuming Schaerrer
could establish a defect, both PCCA and Stewart's are one hundred percent liable for
-14-

plaintiffs injuries because they were both in the chain of distribution. The liability of
both PCCA and Stewart's occurs by operation of law and it is, in practical effect, joint
and several. The jury, given the available evidence, would have no basis to apportion
fault between PCCA and Stewart's. Even if this could somehow be accomplished,
whatever percentage of fault was assigned to Stewart's would still trigger PCCA's
indemnification obligation.
Schaerrer's second argument is that even if indemnification exists, it should
not exist in this case. To support this argument plaintiff now asserts that Stewart's failure
to warn of risks of the one-a-day phen-fen capsule or that Stewart's mis-marketing of this
product or the fact that Stewart's role wasn't "passive" could support independent claims
by Schaerrer against Stewart's. This argument overlooks the fact that Schaerrer conceded
and the trial court's unchallenged ruling establishes that Stewart's did nothing to alter the
drug in any way. There was absolutely no evidence presented to the trial court that either
"failure to warn" or "mis-marketing" of the one-a-day phen-fen capsule caused injury.
The trial court indisputably found that the "one-a-day phen-fen capsule" presented no
greater risk of injury or harm than taking the drugs separately. Therefore, there can be no
causal connection between a failure to warn of the risks of the one-a-day capsule, or mismarketing of the one-a-day capsule, or other "active" conduct and plaintiffs injuries.
There can be no strict liability or other fault without causation. Burns v. Cannondale
Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah App. 1984); Kent v. Pioneer Valley Hosp., 930
P.2d 904, 906 (Utah App. 1997); Fitz v. Synthes, 990 P.2d 391, 393 (Utah 1999). The
-15-

record contains no such evidence and therefore, those claims couldn't be submitted to the
jury. Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433 (Utah 1996).
CONCLUSION
(Schaerrer's Appeal)
Stewart's respectfully urges this court to affirm the trial court's grant of
summary judgment as described in the trial court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Judgment. (Add. tab 3.)

CROSS-APPEAL
POINT I
STEWART'S IS IMMUNE FROM SCHAERRER'S CLAIMS OF
STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY,
The issue presented by Stewart's Cross-Appeal appears to be a matter of
first impression in the United States. Long-standing legal principles are, however, closely
analogous.
Traditionally, pharmacists have been considered immune from claims of
strict product liability relating to alleged defects in the drugs they provide customers
pursuant to prescriptions. See, Coyle v. Bonnet Lane Pharmacy, 584 A.2d 1383, 13871388 (Pa. 1991). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court thoroughly addressed the
underpinnings of the historical immunity afforded pharmacists for alleged defects in
prescription drugs. The court noted that pharmacists do not choose which drugs they
-16-

supply and therefore, pharmacists should neither be liable for defects in those drugs, nor
should pharmacists be required to warn of the drugs' dangers. The role of choosing drugs
and supplying information regarding those drugs is more properly served by physicians.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
Unlike the marketing system for most other products, the
distribution system for prescription drugs is highly restricted.
Pharmacists, as suppliers do not freely choose which products
they will make available to consumers in any given instance,
and patients, as consumers, do not freely choose which
products to buy. Physicians exercising sound medical
judgment act as intermediaries in the chain of distribution,
preempting, as it were, the exercise of discretion by the
supplier pharmacist and within limits, by the patient
consumer.
Id. at 1385. The court also noted that holding pharmacists strictly liable for defects in
drugs would not serve the underlying purpose of strict product liability, that of improving
the safety of products. The Pennsylvania Court reasoned that regardless of which drug is
prescribed, the pharmacist is not:
at liberty to substitute his judgment of the product's safety for
the patient for that of the physician. Similarly, as to
preventing the circulation of defective products, it would illserve the needs of the public to impose a duty on pharmacists
under which, to avoid potential liability, they might refuse to
fill prescriptions . . . .
Id. at 1386.

See, also, Murphy v. E.R. Squid & Sons, Inc., 710 P.2d 247, 249 (Calif.

1985); Leesley v. West, 518 N.E.2d 758, 761-783 (111. App. 1988); Raynor v. RichardsMerrill, Inc., 743 F. Supp. 238, 247 (D. D.C. 1986). Based upon the immunity
established in the foregoing authority, Stewart's moved for summary judgment.
-17-

The trial court denied Stewart's motion because it identified an issue of fact
which precluded summary judgment. The trial court concluded that a jury could find that
Stewart's acted not exclusively as a pharmacist, but also acted as a manufacturer by
combining phentermine and fenfluramine into a one-a-day product not otherwise
available. Stewart's role as a manufacturer, the trial court reasoned, eliminated the
pharmacist's immunity. (Add. tab 1.)
Stewart's urges this Court to adopt a rule of law whereby a pharmacist who
engages in some manufacturing activity (such as combining phentermine and
fenfluramine in one capsule) still faces no strict product liability so long as the
pharmacist's manufacturing activities are tangential and do not render the drug(s) any
more dangerous than they otherwise would have been, and the drugs are supplied
pursuant to a valid prescription by physician. It is undisputed that nothing Stewart's did
in its role as a "manufacturer" altered the outcome of this case in any respect. Therefore,
while Stewart's may be a "manufacturer" for the limited purpose of creating the one-aday phen-fen combination capsule, the reasons Stewart's faces strict product liability, if
at all, has nothing to do with that manufacturing role. Stewart's faces strict products
liability because it was in the chain of distribution of fenfluramine. As is applicable to
this case, Stewart's role was no different than any other pharmacist filling a prescription
and therefore, the traditional immunity afforded pharmacists from claims of strict product
liability should still apply to Stewart's.

-18-

It is fenfluramine which is at the heart of plaintiff's case and with respect to
fenfluramine, Stewart's role was simply that of a pharmacist: he purchased fenfluramine
from a supplier, and provided it to the plaintiff, without material alteration, pursuant to a
valid prescription. As such, he should be entitled to the same immunity afforded to all
pharmacists. Schaerrer's right of recovery for strict liability should be limited to the drug
manufacturer and wholesale supplier.5
CONCLUSION
Stewart's respectfully requests this Court to reverse the decision of the trial
court and to enter judgment in Stewart's favor as a matter of law dismissing plaintiffs
strict product liability claims.
Respectfully submitted this ^ O ^ day of April, 2002.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON

^v^^^ii^L,

Michael P. Zapcheo
Attorneys for Appellees/Cross-Appellants
Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy

5

Of course, if Schaerrer could have established the elements of a negligence claim
against Stewart's, she could recover on that basis. No evidence, however, establishes
causation.
-19-
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JEANNE SCHAERRER,
Petitioner

ORDER DENYING SUMMARY

JUDGMENT
vs.

Date: September 1, 2000

PROFESSIONAL COMPOUNDING
CENTERS OF AMERICA, INC, et al,
Respondents

Case Number: 980406564
Division V: Judge James R. Taylor

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy and Stewart
Koeven's (Defendant Stewart) motion for summary judgment. The Utah Supreme Court has
given the court the following guidelines for making a ruling of summary judgment:
If there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning questions of fact, the doubt
should be resolved in favor of the [non-moving] party. Thus, the court must evaluate
all the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in the
light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Wilkinson v. Union
Pac. R.R. Co.. 975 P.2d 464,465 (Utah 1998) quoting Bowen v. Riverton Citv. 656
P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982).
Additionally, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure contain this rule for making a ruling of
summary judgment:
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
The court will now recite the facts and inferences that it relies on according to the
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aforementioned guidelines to make its decision to deny summary judgment for Defendants
Stewart Koeven, and Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy. The Defendant pharmacist combined the
prescribed fenfluramine with other substances: phentermine, which was prescribed, and afillerand
a time-release agent which were not. Combination of these drugs into a single uone a day"
capsule was the idea of the Defendant and was marketed by him to patients of local physicians by
word of mouth. The court must assume, and Defendants concede that in considering this motion,
defendants acted as a manufacturer.1 Defendants provided no warnings to the Plaintiffs physician
about potential side effects, etc., for this new drug combination. Defendants could not have
known without testing whether the fenfluramine would be released over a period of time as
intended.2 For the purposes of this motion it is assumed that sufficient evidence is available to
establish a causative link between the fenfluramine ingested by the Plaintiff and her physical
ailment.
The Plaintiff argues that because the Defendant pharmacist "manufactured" a new
product, he is strictly liable to the Defendant for any harm as if he had originally manufactured the
fenfluramine itself. The Defendant counters that since there is no evidence that the drug in
capsulated combination with other ingredients caused any harm that would not have occurred
from ingestion in the fashion expected by the primary supplier of fenfluramine, the general
exclusion of pharmacists from theories of strict liability applicable to a manufacturer of the drug
should apply in this case. The earliest case that the court canfindthat exempts a pharmacist from

1

See quotation of Statutory definition and discussion infra.

2

See uncontroverted testimony of Dr. Wooley at page 12 of Plaintiffs Memo in
Opposition to Summary Judgment.
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strict liability is McLeod v. W. S. Merrell Co.. 174 So2d 736 (Fla 1965). The original claim was
one of implied warranty of fitness, but the Florida Supreme Court recognized that the action was
also based on the concept of strict liability.3 The court noted that comment k4 of § 402A of the
Restatement 2d of Torts provides for an exception to strict liability for pharmacists under these
same conditions. The court also noted that applying strict liability to pharmacists would result in
their becoming insurers of the safety of drugs manufactured by others.5 The Restatement of the
Law Third, Torts-Product Liability § 6 (e) and comment h also recognize the pharmacy
exception, noting a couple of exceptions:
(e) A retail seller or other distributor of a prescription drug or medical device is
subject to liability for harm caused by the drug or device if:
(1) at the time of sale or other distribution the drug or medical device contains

3

McLeod at 739.

4

The court recognizes that courts have interpreted this comment in different ways. Here
is the text of the comment:
k. Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present state of human
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are
especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur
treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging consequences when
it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the
use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree ofriskwhich they
involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is
not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and
the like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or under the
prescription of a physician. It is also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which,
because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance
of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the
marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller of such
products, again with the qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper
warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate
consequences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an
apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
5

McLeod at 739.
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a manufacturing defect as defined in § 2(a); or
(2) at or before the time of sale or other distribution of the drug or medical
device the retail seller or other distributor fails to exercise reasonable care and
such failure causes harm to persons,
h. Liability of retail seller of prescription drugs and medical devices for defective
designs and defects due to inadequate instructions or warnings. The rule governing
most products imposes liability on wholesalers and retailers for selling a defectively
designed product, or one without adequate instructions or warnings, even though they
have exercised reasonable care in marketing the product. See § 1, Comment e, and
§ 2, Comment o. Courts have refused to apply this general rule to nonmanufacturing
retail sellers of prescription drugs and medical devices and, instead, have adopted the
rule stated in Subsection (e). That rule subjects retailers to liability only if the product
contains a manufacturing defect or if the retailer fails to exercise reasonable care in
connection with distribution of the drug or medical device. In so limiting the liability
of intermediary parties, courts have held that they should be permitted to rely on the
special expertise of manufacturers, prescribing and treating health-care providers, and
governmental regulatory agencies. They have also emphasized the needs of medical
patients to have ready access to prescription drugs at reasonable prices.
The Covle case also cites the following cases as refusing to apply strict liability to
pharmacists: Ravnorv. Richardson-Merrell. Inc.. 643 F.Supp. 238 (D.D.C.1986); Ramirez v.
Richardson-Merrell. Inc.. 628 F.Supp. 85 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Murphv v. E.R. Squibb & Sons. 40
CaL3d 672, 221 Cal.Rptr. 447, 710 P.2d 247 (1985); Ullman v. Grant 114 Misc.2d 220, 450
N.Y.S.2d 955 (1982); Batiste v. American Home Products Corp., 32 N.C.App. 1, 231 S.E.2d 269
(1977); Bichlerv. Willing. 58 AX>.2d 331, 397 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1977).*
The Plaintiff argues that because the pharmacist stepped out of the traditional role of
receiving andfillingprescriptions he becomes strictly liable for harm that might resultfromthe
noxious substance. The burden of strict liability and the duty to warn of defects is placed upon
manufacturers to encourage careful testing, research and warnings that precede or accompany the

6

Covle v. Richardson-Merrell Inc.. 584 A.2d 1383 (PA 1991) at 1387-1388.
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product into the marketplace.7 The Pharmacist in this case wants the best of both worlds. He
wants the economic profit from making a desirable product available for sale but wants to avoid
the testing, research, and warning responsibility that generally attach to the introduction of a new
product. The court cannot distinguish between the Defendant Stewart as a manufacturer and
other named defendants, who are acknowledged manufacturers but who are not the manufacturers
of the original fenfluramine powder. These other manufacturers merely purchased fenfluramine
powder and put it into a pill or capsule form. They cannot escape liability under the doctrine of
strict liability for manufacturers of defective or dangerous products and neither should Defendants
Stewart if he acted as a manufacturer.
No regulated or controlled substance is intended to be sold without an intervening
physician's prescription. Nevertheless, a manufacturer may still be strictly liable for a dangerous
or defective product. There simply is no good reason not to apply the same standards to this
Defendant. There is evidence in this case from which a juiy could find that he stepped from
behind the pharmacist's counter and became a manufacturer by creating and marketing a product
not otherwise available. The Utah Code gives this definition of manufacturing, which appears to
encompass what Defendant Stewart did:
(22) "Manufacture":
(a) means the production, preparation, propagation, compounding, conversion, or
processing of a prescription drug or a device, either directly or indirectly . . . and
includes any packaging or repackaging of a substance or labeling or relabeling of its
container; {U.C.A. 58-17a-102 (22). Definitions.}
Something in the product appears to have had negative physical consequences. The pharmacist

7

For example see Covle v. Richardson-Merrell Inc.. 584 A.2d 1383 (PA 1991) at 1387,
which states that strict liability provides an incentive to safety.
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exception to the doctrines of strict liability and a manufacturer's duty to warn does not apply in
this case. The motion for summary judgment is denied.
Dated this 1* day of Septemb£L2000

Copies of this Order mailed to:
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Counsel for the Respondent:
Mailed this

\

day of

^)ZJQA

, 2000, postage pre-paid as noted above.

Atu

Court Clerk
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Jeanne Schaerrer,
Plaintiff

:
Memorandum Decision

vs.

Date: October 18,2000

Professional Compounding Centers
of America, Inc., et aL
Defendants

Case Number. 980406564
Division V: Judge James R. Taylpr

This matter comes before the Court on the motion of Defendants Stewart Plara Pharmacy
and Stewart Koeven, RJPltfor reconsideration/clarification.
In the Plaintiff's complaint, paragraph 64 on page 19, she has alleged that combining
phentermine, fenfluamine and a time-release agent in a single capsule "caused an even greater risk
of unreasonable, dangerous side effects" than taking the drugs separately. During oral arguments
it was stipulated that the Plaintiff had or would present no evidence that the combination of the
drugs created a greater harm or danger than ingestion of the drugs separately. That oositioitts reaffirmed in the Plaintiffs brief in opposition totinsmotion on page one: "[tjhrough her counsel,
Plaintiff has already stipulated on the record that she will not seek to introduce evidence that
Stewart's compounded capsule cause increasedriskof injury to her." Based upon that stipulation
the Courtfindsthat partial summary judgment, on that limited portion of the complaint is
appropriate and should be granted. It is the intent ofthis Court to predude by ^
from the Plaintiff that the combination of the various drugs created amore seriousriskof harm
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than ingestion of the drags separately and any resultant damage attributable completely to that
increased risk. Counsel for the Defendants is directed to prepare an appropriate order in
accordance with Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Adminisbation.
Dated this 18* day of Octobe%200pj&l

Judge J^esRi^faylor /$.
Fourtn Judicial District Court
Copies of this Order mailed to:
Charles F.Abbott
Scott Walker
3651 North 100 East, Suite 300
Provo, Utah 84604

Craig N. Hentschel
Michael EL Walker
777FigueroaSt.44th
Los Angeles, California 90017-5844

Richard Heimann
Richard M. Franco
Embarcadero Center West
275 Battery Street, 30* Floor
San Francisco, California 84111-3339

Dennis Ferguson
257 East 200 South, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Camille N. Johnson
Brian P. Miller
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Mailed this

_dayof_

Michael P. Zaccheo
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Flooi
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465

, 2000, postage pre-paid as noted above.

Court Clerk U
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of Utah County, State of Utah
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MICHAEL P. ZACCHEO (A4450)
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for DEFENDANTS STEWART PLAZA PHARMACY
AND STEWART KOEVEN, R.PH.

Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801) 531-2000
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JEANNE SCHAERRER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
PROFESSIONAL COMPOUNDING
CENTERS OF AMERICA, INC.,
STEWART'S PLAZA PHARMACY, INC.,
STEWART KOEVEN, R.PH., JEFFREY W.
JOHNSON, M.D., AMERICAN HOME
PRODUCTS CORP., AH. ROBINS
COMPANY, INCORPORATED, WYETHAYERST LABORATORIES COMPANY,
INC.,

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND JUDGMENT
(Proposed)
Case No. 980406564
Judge James Taylor

Defendants.
On or about November 29, 2000, defendants Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy and
Stewart Koeven (hereinafter "Stewart's"), by and through their counsel of record, Michael P.
Zaccheo, RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON, submitted to the court a Motion for Summary
Judgment, supported by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities, along with certain exhibits.

Thereafter, plaintiff, by and through her counsel of record, Richard M . Franco, LlEFF,
CABRASER, HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN,

LLP, and Charles F. Abbott,

ABBOTT & WALKER,

submitted

a Memorandum in Opposition to Stewards Motion for Summary Judgment and Stewart's, by and
through counsel,-submitted a Reply Memorandum. On Thursday, January 25, 2001, the court
heard oral argumentfromMr. Zaccheo on behalf of Stewart's, and Mr. Franco, on behalf of the
plaintiff, regarding Stewart's Motion for Summary Judgment. After consideration of the parties'
memoranda, oral argument, and applicable Utah law, the court enters the following Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment pursuant to Rules 52, and 56, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, and Rule 4-504, Utah Rules of Judicial Administration.
FINDINGS OF FACTS
Based upon the pleadings, the evidence submitted to the court by the parties, the
admissions of counsel, and the court's priorfindings,the court hereby finds that the following
facts are uncontroverted and that no material issue of fact remains regarding the following:
1.

The plaintiff Jeanne Schaerrer on several occasions purchased the drug

fenfluramine from defendant Stewart's. All of the fenfluramine supplied to Jeanne Schaerrer by
Stewart's was purchased by Stewart'sfromdefendant Professional Compounding Centers of
America ("PCCA").
2.

Stewart's combined the fenfluramine purchased from PCCA, with the drug

phentermine and a time-release agent to create a one-a-day "phen-fen" capsule. It was in the form

2

of this capsule that Stewart's supplied fenfluramine to Jeanne Schaerrer. No evidence has been
submitted to the court which would support an inference that the combining of fenfluramine,
phentermine and a time-release agent in a single capsule altered or affected the fenfluramine in any
way. No evidence has been submitted to the court that would support an inference that Stewart's
altered, in any way material to this action, the fenfluramine that was purchased from PCCA and
was ultimately consumed by the plaintiff. The fenfluramine supplied by Stewart's was in no way
more dangerous or more likely to cause injury to the plaintiff than was fenfluramine supplied to
the plaintiff by, for example, defendant American Home Products, which was not combined in a
single capsule with phentermine or any other substance. Thisfindingwas also made by the court
in connection with an earlier motion for summary judgment submitted by Stewart's and is
reflected in the court's rulings of September 1, 2000, and October 18, 2000, denying Stewart's
Motion for Summary Judgment and granting partial summary judgment, respectively. The court's
Order of September 1, 2000, and the court's Order of October 18,2000, are both incorporated
into thesefindingsand conclusions as if fully set forth.
3.

Plaintiff has alleged in her Complaint that she sustained injury as a result of

having ingested the drug fenfluramine and that Stewart's is liable based upon theories of
negligence and strict products liability. Based upon the court's ruling of October 18,2000,
plaintiffs only remaining cause of action against Stewart's is based upon strict product liability.

3

4.

In this case, in order to recover based upon the theory of strict product

liability, the jury would have to conclude that Stewart's was a manufacturer with regard to the
fenfluramine supplied to the plaintiff. For purposes of thesefindingsof fact, conclusions of law
and judgment, the court has assumed that the jury would indeed conclude that Stewart's was a
manufacturer. As a manufacturer, Stewart's would be liable for a defect, if any, in the drug
fenfluramine which it supplied to the plaintiff
5.

For purposes of this motion, the court has assumed that the plaintiff would

be able to meet her burden to establish that the drug fenfluramine was defective as that term is
defined under Utah law for purposes of strict product liability.
6.

On or about January 19, 2000, the plaintiff executed a Release and

Settlement Agreement with defendant PCCA. In pertinent part, the Release provided as follows:
III.
PLAINTIFF'S AGREEMENT AND WAIVER AS TO CLAIMS AGAINST PCCA
FOR CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY
(READ CAREFULLY)
In exchange for the consideration paid to Plaintiff and as part of the
Release granted to PCCA, Plaintiff specifically agrees that she will
not seek to recoverfromPCCA any damages attributable to
PCCA's proportionate share of fault, if any, which may be
determined under the applicable provisions of the Utah Liability
Reform Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27, etseq. In addition, Plaintiff
agrees that, to the extent that any party to the lawsuit or any other
tort feasor, person, or entity obtains afinaljudgment against PCCA
for contribution or indemnity for damage arisingfromthe subject of
this Lawsuit, Plaintiff waives herrightto recoverfromsaid party,
4

tort feasor, person, or entity any damages up to and including the
total amount of the judgment against PCCA for indemnity. Plaintiff
further agrees subject to approval of the court, that PCCA need not
participate further in defense of itself in this action, even for the
purpose of having fault and/or indemnity determined.

7.

On or about February 8, 1999, Stewart's filed a Cross-Claim against

defendant PCCA. The Cross-Claim asserted that Stewart's had a right of common-law
indemnification against PCCA in the event that the fenfluramine supplied by PCCA to Stewart's
was determined to be defective. After plaintiff settled with PCCA, plaintiffs claims against
PCCA were, by stipulation, dismissed by the court. The Cross-Claim of Stewart's against PCCA
was not dismissed.
8.

Neither in her Memorandum in Opposition to Stewart's Motion for

Summary Judgment, nor at oral argument, did plaintiff contest the validity of the provision of the
PCCA Release which is quoted herein. No evidence was submitted to the court to suggest that
the terms of the PCCA Release should not be enforced according to the ordinary meaning of its
plain and unambiguous terms.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The court hereby adopts the following conclusions of law:
1.

The court hereby incorporates all conclusions of law set forth in the court's

Orders of September 1,2000, denying Stewart's Motion for Summary Judgment, and October 18,
2000, granting partial summary judgment to Stewart's.
5

2.

The pertinent provision of the PCCA Release is unambiguous and

enforceable according to its plain terms. Pursuant to the terms of the Release, plaintiff agreed to
waive any right to recovery from any party that obtained a judgment of indemnification against
PCCA. Therefore, if Stewart's is entitled in this matter to indemnification from PCCA for
damages awarded to the plaintiff, then plaintiff has agreed to waive herrightto recover from
Stewart's.
3.

In Utah, each entity in the chain of distribution of a defective product is

entitled to obtain indemnification from those supplying the defective product, provided the
indemnitee did not alter or modify the product in such a way as to increase its dangerous qualities
or to introduce the defect.1 Resolving every reasonable inference in plaintiffs favor, no evidence
has been submitted to the court to establish that Stewart's in any way altered or increased the
danger of the fenfluramine supplied to it by PCCA before it was consumed by the plaintiff. The
courtfindsthat as a matter of law Stewart's would be entitled to indemnification fronrPCCA for
any defect in the drug fenfluramine which was consumed by the plaintiff.
4.

The court rejects plaintiffs argument that the enactment of the Utah

Liability Reform Act, Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-37, 38 (199.9) eliminated indemnification as
it applies in this case to PCCA and Stewart's in the context of a strict product liability claim.

l

See Hanover Ltd v. Cissna, 758 P.2d 443,445-446 (Utah App. 1988); National Serv. Indus. V.
D. W. Norton, 937 P.2d 551 (Utah App. 1997). This also appears to be the law in the majority of the
states. Hanover, 758 P.2d at 446; Roland Truck v. Everwear, 468 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1985).
6

5.

Having determined that Stewart's is entitled as a matter of law to judgment

against PCCA for indemnity for damages awarded to Jeanne Schaerrer as a result of her
remaining strict product liability claims, the court furtherfindsthat pursuant to the terms of the
PCCA Release, plaintiff would inevitably be required to waive herrightto recover from Stewart's
any damages arisingfroma defect in the drug fenfluramine. The court determines that requiring
Stewart's and the plaintiff to conduct a long and expensive trial would be wasteful and inefficient
and would inevitably, if the plaintiff succeeded in obtaining a favorable verdict, result in plaintiff
waiving her right to recover from Stewart's. Therefore, the court grants summary judgment in
Stewart's favor, dismissing plaintiff's only remaining claim, that of strict product liability, with
prejudice and on the merits, each party to bear their owns costs and attorneys' fees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Having considered the arguments of the parties, and having entered findings of fact
and conclusions of law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Stewart's
Motion for Summary Judgment filed on or about November 29, 2000, is granted, and plaintiffs

7

Complaint against Stewart's is dismissed, with prejudice and on the merits, each party to bear
their own costs and attorneys' fees.
DATED this 5£> day of

A^/ f W \

APPROVED AS TO FORM

LIEFF, CABRASER, HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP,

Richard M. Franco
Attorneys Plaintiff Jeanne Schaerrer
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£Lsi*v,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument
was mailed,first-class,postage prepaid, on this 1 ^ day of \c6fcu.s &j(
2001, to the
following:
Charles F. Abbott
Scott Walker

Craig N. Hentschel
Michael H. Walizer

ABBOTT & WALKER

ARNOLD & PORTER

3651 North 100 East, Suite 300
Provo, Utah 84604

777 Figueroa St, 44*
Los Angeles, CA 90017-5844

Richard Heimann
Richard M. Franco

Dennis C. Ferguson
WILLIAMS & HUNT

257 East 200 South, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

LEFF, CABRASER, HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN

Embarcadero Center West
275 Battery Street, 30th Floor
San Francisco, California 94111-3339
Telephone (415) 956-1000
Camille N. Johnson
Brian P. Miller
SNOW, CHRETENSEN & MARTTNEAU

10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
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